Содержание к диссертации
Введение
CHAPTER I. The question of namibia: background and the settlement plan
Historical overview 27
Contact Group: proposal for a settlement 34
Report of the Secretary General 41
Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) 46
South African intransigence 47
Interpreting the mandate 49
Demilitarized zone 50
Internal settlement: the Zimbabwe precedent 52
Geneva pre-implementation conference 55
Summary 56
CHAPTER II. Hostage politics: constructive engagement and linkage 1981-1988
"Constructive engagement" and "linkage" 58
Emergency special session: uniting for peace 62
Linkage rejected 64
Illusion of progress: the 1982 agreements 67
Operations Protea and Askari 69
From linkage to disengagement of forces 71
The Lusaka Agreement 72
MPC and interim government 75
Outstanding issues resolved 77
The south-western Africa peace process 78
Clark Amendment: Angola breaks off talks 80
Cuito Cuanavale and Calueque: the turning point 83
Principles for a peaceful settlement 86
Geneva Protocol 86
Secretary General visits South Africa 87
Brazzaville Protocol: back to the UN 88
New York Accords 89
South Africa negotiates 91
The "Soviet bogey" 92
Summary 98
CHAPTER III. Implementation of the settlement plan january - april 1989
Towards the implementation process 100
Enter Non-Aligned Movement 104
Security Council Resolutions 628 and 629 (1989) 110
Report of the Secretary General 114
Explanatory statement: "bankable assurances" 119
Security Council Resolution 632 (1989) 121
Events of early April: the massacre 122
United Nations reaction 123
Outrage: Pretoria both judge and jury 125
Joint commission 127
Ahtisaari: partial or impartial? 129
UN responsibility: UNTAG not deployed 131
SWAPO in Namibia: invasion or assembly? 132
Confidential Geneva Protocol 134
Ceasefire: meaning and publicity 135
SWAPO bases 136
Brutality and revenge 137
Summary 138
CHAPTER IV. Implementation of the settlement plan may 1989 - march 1990
Damage Control 141
Observer missions 142
Koevoet: intimidation 144
Pre-conditions for free and fair elections 145
Secretary General visits Namibia 152
Administrator General: impartiality 153
Group of 18 visits 154
Security Council debate 154
Security Council Resolution 640 (1989) 156
Nujoma returns: security concerns 157
South Africa indicted 158
Change of guard at NAM 160
Security Council Resolution 643 (1989) 163
Elections: SWAPO victory 167
UNTAG operations: an overview 169
Post-election implementation process 171
Summary 174
Conclusion p.175
Bibliography p.180
Appendices
- Internal settlement: the Zimbabwe precedent
- Cuito Cuanavale and Calueque: the turning point
- Explanatory statement: "bankable assurances"
- Pre-conditions for free and fair elections
Введение к работе
South West Africa (Namibia)1 formally became a German colony as a result of the 1884 Berlin Conference on the "Partition of Africa". It became a Mandate Territory in 1920 under the League of Nations, administered by South Africa on behalf of the United Kingdom. Following the establishment of the United Nations Organization (UN) in 1945, the Territory was placed, along with other colonies of the erstwhile "enemy state", Germany [among them Tanganyika (now part of the United Republic of Tanzania), Cameroon and Togo], under the trusteeship system. However, Namibia soon became victim to the expansionist ambitions of what before the non-racial democratic elections in South Africa in 1994 was generally termed "the South African racist white minority settler regime".2 Pretoria refused to grant the Territory the new status. On 27 October 1966, after failing to make any headway with South Africa, the General Assembly terminated the mandate - the same year that SWAPO launched the armed struggle for independence - and reaffirmed the international status of the Territory.3 In 1971, the International Court of Justice rendered an advisory opinion that supported the General Assembly decision. The UN therefore, had a legal and historical obligation to bring Namibia to independence in the same manner that the other former trust territories achieved self-determination. The present study is a critique on the role of the world body in fulfilling this historical and legal responsibility.
The question of Namibia was one of the most important issues on which the Ulf stood on a moral high ground and was at the same time one of its biggest failures. For roughly 45 years, the Organization (or at least the overwhelming majority of its members) relentlessly championed the attainment of the purposes and principles of the UN Charter - respect for equal rights, fundamental freedoms and the self-determination of all peoples - which were eventually achieved in Namibia under the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) operation in 1989-1990.
Namibia also represented a failure for the UN because for an equally long period, the Organization failed to live up to the above principles, allowing the inalienable rights і of the people of Namibia to be a "side-show" in a game of superpower rivalry and other [ global, strategic and economic considerations. The United States of America (US) used і the policies of "constructive engagement" and "linkage" of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola to the implementation of the settlement plan as pretexts for delaying Namibia s independence. Issues that the UN is grappling with today and which threaten the very existence of the Organization, such as "unilateralism", manifested themselves early on during the attempts to resolve the impasse. The driving force behind South Africa s refusal to end its illegal occupation of Namibia was Pretoria s age-old expansionist policy and desire to perpetuate the policy of apartheid, a crime against humanity,4 by using Namibia as a "buffer" and exploiting its natural and human resources. When Pretoria realized "the limits of its military power" and agreed to the implementation of the settlement plan, the refrain from the majority of the international community in describing South Africa s actions was "non-compliance". Aim of the research
The aim or objective of the thesis is to examine colonialism, especially as it related to Namibia but also to the world in general. It does so by studying the role of the most universal international organization that the world has seen to date as well as other actors on the world stage. By recording his own experiences in the diplomacy and negotiations, especially at the UN, though only in the last but crucial stages on the Namibian national liberation process, the author hopes that this personal dimension enhances his contribution towards that effort.
The so-called journeys of discovery of the "new worlds" pioneered by "explorers" such as Vasco da Gama and Christopher Columbus in the 15th century heralded the era of modern colonialism that began with the trans-Atlantic slave trade and has been characterized by the competition for resources and "space" that led to the two World Wars and now the occupation of Iraq, among other manifestations of the practice. The straggle for national liberation was one of the major defining phenomena of the second half of the Twentieth Century. Unfortunately, despite having made advances in the fight against this evil of colonialism, the world is once more witnessing the emergence of new imperialism, and even colonialism and re-colonization. Robert Cooper, diplomatic adviser to British Prime Minister Tony Blair in the early part of this Twenty-first Century explained what this new imperialism means thus: "Among ourselves [i.e. the West] we operate on the basis of laws and open cooperative security. But when dealing with more old fashioned kinds of states outside post modern Europe, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era - force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is , necessary".5 This is what is now being practiced in Afghanistan and Iraq under the pretext of fighting terrorism.
In Southern Africa, as elsewhere, this new imperialism is being pursued under the guise of promoting human rights, democracy, free and fair elections, the rule of law, freedom of the press and other high sounding phrases. The reality however, as demonstrated over Zimbabwe, is to secure resources. In this study, we are implicitly asking the question: "What role can the UN and other multilateral organizations play \ under these new challenges that the world faces today?" і
Assembly adopted and opened for signature and ratification the "International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid".
Practical importance and "novelty" of the thesis
Activities of the UN have been the corner stone of international relations for over the past half a century. The thesis is important in that it examines decolonization - a primary objective of the Organization as enshrined in its Charter. It is a statement on one of the moral global achievements of the twentieth century - the formal collective recognition of the historical injustice of colonialism. Under Chapter 1 (Article 1) -Purposes and Principles - the Organization undertakes to develop friendly relations among nations based on "respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples". Under Chapter XI - Declaration Regarding Non-Self Governing Territories (Article 73) - members of the UN which had or assumed responsibilities for the administration of territories "whose peoples [had] not yet attained a full measure of self government", recognised the principle that the "interests of the inhabitants of these territories [were] paramount, and [accepted] as a sacred trust, the obligation to promote to the utmost, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories". The basic objective of the trusteeship system under Chapter XII - International Trusteeship System (Article 76) - was "to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence [in accordance with their] freely expressed wishes".
The thesis is about the practical implementation of the right of all peoples to national self-determination. Contrary to the positions stated by the General Assembly that the dispute was between the people of Namibia and South Africa; the thesis finds that it was in fact between the UN and South Africa. The thesis contributes to the literature on the role of the international community on the struggle against colonialism in Namibia in particular, and the world in general.
The Front-line States (FLS),7 acting on behalf of the Organization for African Unity (OAU), now succeeded by the African Union (AU), played a critical role towards the continental organization s goal of the total liberation of Africa. From the point of view that the study has been carried out from Zimbabwean and FLS angle, the thesis is a S pioneer in documenting the critical role of this alliance in the African liberation struggles. 1
National liberation was a key objective for the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The implementation of the Namibia settlement plan provided the Movement with the opportunity, under the Chairmanship of Zimbabwe (1986-1989), to play a key role in achieving that objective. The thesis is also a pioneer in recognizing and acknowledging the role of the Movement in the resolution of the question of Namibia. While some studies have been done on the implementation of the settlement plan,8 this work breaks new ground by examining the process from inside the corridors of the UN in New York, revealing the negotiating strategies and bargaining processes that were to shape the destiny of a nation. The author hopes that the thesis will be an inspiration not only to scholars, but also to politicians and diplomats that participated in the process to tell the story of this, one of the longest running items on the agenda of the UN, from their own perspectives.
The thesis covers a range of practical issues in international relations: colonialism j and its settler variant; decolonization and national liberation; racism, racial discrimination, apartheid and xenophobia; pan-Africanism; international organization, ; regional alliances and alliance-building; multilateralism, and unilateralism; the role of national interests and geo-politics in international relations; foreign policy, diplomacy, negotiations, conflict prevention, management and resolution; peacemaking, j peacekeeping and peace building; the twentieth century epic struggle for power between !
the US and the former Soviet Union etc. The thesis would be useful for researchers, \ teachers and students of history, political science and international relations as well as for ! politicians and diplomats, especially in this age where the role of the UN has become the \ subject of much debate.
Period Covered ) The thesis covers the period between 1978 and 1990 in the history of Namibia \ vis-a-vis the role of the UN. The year 1978 has been selected as the starting point of the study because it was in that year that the world Organization first drew up and agreed on a concrete plan for the independence of Namibia. It was also in that year that, under the settlement plan, the Territory should have become independent. The period therefore, gives us an opportunity to examine the dynamics that were responsible for the delay of I that country s independence for over 10 years.
Methodology
In terms of methodology, several international relations theories converge in the analysis of the question of Namibia, highlighting the reality that inter-state relations are not a zero sum game. The theories applicable to the conflict include, but are not limited to colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism, neo-imperialism, settler colonialism, realpolitik, hegemonism, competition, conflict, collaboration, unilateralism, multilateralism and international organization, as well as nationalism, Pan-Africanism etc.9
On the one hand, Namibia was essentially the victim of colonialism and imperialism. Attempts to resolve the impasse through collective action - the basis of the UN multilateral system - were hampered by realpolitik, great power rivalry and ; hegemonistic ambitions of a few nations. Nevertheless, the question of Namibia demonstrated the relevance of international organization as a theory and practice in th_ management and regulation of international relations. At the same time, the veto power was proof that some members in the UN and other multilateral systems are more equal than others. This factor can significantly militate against the interests of the weaker contries. Regional organizations, in particular the OAU and the FLS played a critical role l / , L СГ in assisting the people of Namibia in their just struggle for independence. Non-alignment О -;-- the philosophy born of superpower rivalry - became the medium through which the majority of those peoples who had experienced colonialism came to the aid of the Namibian people. "The national liberation movement was a defining feature of the post World War era.
1990.
The national liberation movement was a defining feature of the post World War era. Throughout the conflict, nationalism and Pan-Africanism, were important factors in sustaining the morale and hope of the people of Namibia. This anti-colonialist movement - in Namibia as elsewhere — owed much of its success to the existence of the bi-polar world. It was in the interest of the socialist bloc countries, led by the Soviet Union and which did not own colonies in the classical sense, to help free colonial territories, which were a sources of power for the for the rival Western alliance, led by the US - hence the "natural alliance" between socialism and non-alignment. In the ultimate analysis, j the alliance was a quid-pro-quo that demonstrated realpolitik at work. In some cases, the colonial powers granted the colonies independence in order to prevent the emergence of "armed liberation struggles" that would lead to "instability" and to a situation in which "the communists" would "fish in troubled waters".
The current problems in Southern Africa cannot all be attributed to imperialism per se. Apartheid South Africa s intransigence and the "natural" support that Pretoria received from the former colonial powers were directly related to South Africa s status as a former "settler colony". Settler colonialism or "colonialism of a special type" has been, and continues to be, a significant determinant in the politics of Southern Africa, ff In addition to economic, political and strategic interests, "kith and kin" factors were partly responsible for Western support for the apartheid regime, thus prolonging South Africa s illegal occupation of Namibia. Settler colonialism in the sub-region developed into a contradictory relationship of both conflict and cooperation between the settler \ sub-imperialist state and the metropolis. This ambivalent relationship resulted from the j, fact that the settler state desired to be "independent" of the metropolis, which it regarded with suspicion because the latter could not always be relied upon to guarantee settler interests if these were not deemed to be to imperial advantage. Yet the inability ! of the settlers to subdue native resistance and their desire to maintain a buffer or hinterland to protect their power and privileges, often dictated that the settler state seeks ( the assistance and protection of that same metropolis which it regarded with suspicion, j Continued native resistance inevitably led to the settler regimes experiencing what can і be termed the "crisis of legitimacy" - hence the desire to form alliances with, and be accepted by, the Western powers.
These contradictions resulted in "tension" between the West and the settler regimes during the liberation struggles while at the same time the "kith and kin" factor offered opportunities for both the settlers (in the form of Western support) and the West (in the form of maintaining or even extending their spheres of influence) during the Cold War era. In the post-independence era, the settler community has remained an imperialist "outpost", a "fifth column" or a "Trojan horse" in the straggle for power and control of resources in the post-colonial, era, and thus a potential source for foreign intervention. This "kith and kin" factor therefore, partly explains the resilience and endurance of "white power" in the region and its symbiotic relationship to international imperialism.
It has been suggested that by discussing the question of Namibia rather than the country s independence struggle, we are downplaying the struggle. The people of Namibia, under SWAPO - their "sole and authentic representative"11 - played a critical role in their own liberation. It was their struggle that was catalytic in setting the agenda for the UN to play "its role". The author has simply chosen to refer to the terminology that the UN used on its agenda. By referring to "political" settlement, the author wishes to underline that more than forty years after the pan-Africanist Kwame Nkrumah observed that there can be no political independence without economic independence, Namibia, like other former colonies in Africa and elsewhere, achieved only "political" independence.12
Sources
10 Yury Golovin raised this concern during a discussion at the 8 Conference of Africanists, Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1999.
11 The UN General Assembly recognized SWAPO as "the sole and authentic representative" of the people of Namibia [Resolution 31/146] as opposed to the South African-sponsored internal parties that it characterized as "illegitimate groups" [Resolution 36/121].
12 This is ironic because practically every year, the General Assembly recognized the "implications" of "the activities of foreign economic interests" in Namibia, which did not only "mercilessly exploit the human and material resources" but also more importantly, "impeded the progress of the Territory and the right of the people to freedom and independence" [see for example A/RES/2074 (XX) of 17 December 1965]. The General Assembly hoped to address this situation by adopting a number of economic assistance or "nationhood programmes" that were aimed at economically empowering Namibians. The Non-Aligned Movement, despite much resistance from the Western countries, attempted re-enforce Namibia s economic independence by arguing for financial and material assistance from the international community for Namibia during the transition period and after independence - continuing the nationhood programmes started by the General Assembly.
The primary sources for the thesis are UN documents and the author s personal experiences. The Charter, in which the principle of national self-determination is enshrined, has been an important source. General Assembly resolutions on the question of Namibia date back to the Assembly s first session in 1946 while those of the Security Council date back to 1968.13 UN resolutions generally require the Secretary General to compile reports on their implementation. The reports are source material. In addition, there are statements by the President of the Security Council and correspondence between and among interested parties and the United Nations and agreements between parties that are issued and circulated "as documents of either the General Assembly or the Security Council.14
Personal experience has been an important source and inspiration. The author was, in the course of the service of his [Zimbabwean] government, involved in some of the negotiations leading to Namibia s independence. As an Assistant Secretary in the Africa and Middle East Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs beginning in August 1981, his responsibilities included liaising with national liberation movements from Namibia and South Africa, including SWAPO and to act as liaison officer for their officials and those of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) Liberation Committee on visits to Harare. In that capacity, he met with leaders of the liberation movements among them Sam Nujoma of SWAPO, Thabo Mbeki and Oliver Tambo of the African National Congress (ANC) and Ibrahim Gorah of the Pan Africanist Congress of South Africa. The author was also on various occasions, a member of Zimbabwean delegations to Front-line States (FLS) and OAU Liberation Committee meetings. He was also part of the Zimbabwean delegation to a meeting in Harare in the early 1980s with Chester Crocker, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and architect of "constructive engagement" and "linkage", on talks on the independence of Namibia.
Zimbabwe was the Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement from September 1986 to September 1989. As Chairman of the NAM Coordinating Bureau in New York, Zimbabwe was a member of the NAM Security Council Caucus and participated in the General Assembly resolutions are found at . while those of the Security Council are at resolutions-html.
informal consultations of the Security Council. Zimbabwe was also a member of the FLS, and thus took an active part and interest in efforts aimed at achieving Namibia s independence since its own independence in 1980. Most importantly, the author was his country s Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations (New York) from June 1988 to January 1992. The implementation of the UN settlement plan finally took place in 1989. The author was privileged, in that official capacity, to have been directly involved in the negotiating and drafting of all the implementation resolutions. The opportunity to have participated in multilateral or conference diplomacy certainly widened his horizons. In that context, and holding a strong conviction in the dictum that none but ourselves can write our own history, he feels honoured to have played his part in recording what he believes to have been an important objective of his country s foreign policy - the attainment by the people of Namibia of their independence. Although the author s involvement was in the course of service to his government, he wrote the thesis in his personal capacity.
NAM and SWAPO documents we,also an important source; so were books, desk and library research and Internet searches as well as interviews. The Herald and The Sunday Mail (Harare) as well as The Chronicle and The Sunday News (Bulawayo) proved to be invaluable in putting together the chronology of events, especially on the ground in Namibia. The author also had the benefit of "the Soviet/Russian perspective" from his interaction with Russian Africanists in discussions and attendance at seminars organized by the Institute for African Studies in the course of his stay in Moscow. Many of the Africanists were formerly associated with the Soviet Committee of Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization and the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Many of them proved not only to be versed in the African liberation struggles but also to have been directly involved in one way or the other.
Historiography
Studies that have specifically focused on the role of the UN in the political settlement of the question of Namibia include those of the UN,15 and Bugailiskis.16 The subject has largely been addressed in the context of the more numerous studies on South Africa. As Mafeje notes, "hardly any state in Africa has been the subject of so many theses as the South African state".17 Indeed, the present author s M Phil dissertation was related to South Africa.18 Also as Sellstrom says, in Sweden, for example, the question of Namibia in the early 1960s was "initially seen as an extension of the apartheid problem".19 Other studies on Namibia have also been undertaken in the context of liberation movements in Southern Africa generally, such as in the project "the role of the Nordic countries in the national liberation straggle in Southern Africa" discussed below.
For a quick overview of the subject, the following studies are recommended: A Trust Betrayed: Namibia (above); Gorbunov;20 [which also contains UN documents and SWAPO documents such as the Party s constitution, its programmes, communiques and resolutions of Central Committee meetings, addresses by President Nujoma to NAM as well as SWAPO press articles and interviews]; Manning and Green;21 Pritvorov22 which covers the history of Namibia up to independence in 1990; Decree No. 1 adopted by the United Nations Council for Namibia on the protection of the natural resources of Namibia as a heritage for the people of the Territory (1974); Activities of Foreign Economic Interests Operating in Namibia;23 and Hovey. Among the more comprehensive studies, Moleah25 is perhaps unrivalled. He . discusses the impact of settler colonialism, a phenomenon that is often overlooked and yet is a vital tool in analysing developments in Southern Africa.26 Moleah gives a lucid account of Namibia s early history, highlighting how South Africa came to be awarded the mandate and its attempts to annex or incorporate the Territory.27 UN assertion of its responsibility over "the international territory of Namibia" is meticulously traced.28 Quoting extensively from the UN Charter, debates and resolutions as well as the advisory opinions of the 1С J, Moleah exposes the contradictions in South Africa s arguments in its attempts to make Namibia its 5th province. He analyses the reasons behind the formation of the Contact Group (CG) - to shield Pretoria from tougher action by the General Assembly29 and the negotiations that led to the "Proposal for a settlement" of 10 April 1978.30 Cooper31 highlights the role of commercial and economic interests in the conduct of foreign policy, noting that Washington s policy towards Namibia was marked by "contradiction and deceit".32 On the one hand, the policy entailed active participation in establishing and maintaining the economic subordination of the Territory to South Africa (and by implication to the US) and, on the other, "rhetorical protests" against South Africa s violation of human rights".
Evenson and Herbstein34 regard the Treaty of Versailles (establishing the League of Nations and the mandate system) as Namibia s "greatest betrayal",35 noting that one of the ironies of the 201 century" was that "the country given the most solid protection under international law should suffer the more for it".36 Under the appropriate heading of "the deceitful decade", the authors discuss US and South African manoeuvres to delay Namibia s independence through the policies of "constructive engagement" and "linkage".37
SWAPO,38 in the discussion on the period of "colonial conquest", describes the suppression by colonial Germany of the 1904-07 national uprising as "genocidal".39 The liberation movement says that "imperial Germany" was "a late-comer" in the scramble for colonies. In the Organization s analysis, Germany s hunger for colonial possessions was "fuelled more by political than by economic considerations" as, for a long time, "German capitalists showed little interest in the new territory which their government had secured for them to exploit".40 SWAPO also discusses settler colonialism, saying, "The overall strategy of the German colonial regime was to reproduce German society in Africa by creating a colony of European settlement".41
Slipchenko makes a contribution to the understanding of the FLS by stating on of his goals as "to show how the alliance of independent countries in southern Africa originated and how it function[ed]",43 and recounts the history of the alliance,44 noting that, "the foundations" of the group were laid at the first meeting of the presidents of Zambia and Tanzania, Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere on the Rhodesian question on February 15,1965 in Lusaka".45 Interestingly, according to Slipchenko, the US policy of linkage - linking the independence of Namibia to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola - was not an isolated case but reflected a consistent US global strategy. For example, detente with the Soviet Union was linked to the latter s actions and those of its allies around the world; a Riiodesian settlement was linked to promises of financial aid to African countries; the Namibia settlement to "a regional settlement etc. Urnov47 examines the dynamics of South African foreign policy beginning with the expansionist policy and attempts to annex neighbouring territories;48 the establishment of the "independence" of Anglo-Boer colonialism from British imperialism;49 the strategy of equating anticolonialism with communism;50 the "outward looking policy" of Prime Minister Balthazar John Voster etc.51 Urnov rightly points оці that after SWAPO appeared to strengthen its position by means of resolution 385 (1976) the Contact Group (CG) was formed "to avoid confrontation with independent Africa in the Security Council".53 In substituting the Multi-Party Conference (MPC) for the Turnhalle "Constitution", South Africa was "[changing] the masks on the puppets".54 He rightly characterizes Pretoria s "total strategy" of 1976-1980 as "gambling on a policy of force".55
Few studies have equalled Martin and Johnson56 in analysing the delay in the implementation of the settlement plan, which resulted from the twin US policies of "constructive engagement" and "linkage" as well as South African aggression and destabilization in the region. Pretoria sought "to divert attention from the root cause of the growing conflagration of apartheid by presenting it as a total onslaught organized by the Soviet Union and coming from outside the country, and by presenting itself as the last line of defence in protecting Western interests in the region".57 In her contribution, Holness58 discusses how "linkage" suited both Washington and Pretoria; for without the Cubans to use as an issue, the United States would have found it more difficult to present the conflict in the region in global East-West terms and to align itself so completely with the apartheid regime. Equally, the South African government wished to retain the Cuban presence in Angola so they could be seen to be an active ally of the West against the Soviet Union.59
In the same book, Minter60 discusses constructive engagement in the overall context of American foreign policy, rightly noting that the tendency to analyse US policies by contrasting one administration with another pays insufficient attention to the tendencies, policy lines and coalitions which persist from the term of one president to another. For both Democratic and Republican administrations, serious sanctions against South Africa were "ruled out in advance".62
Mandaza,63 like Minter, argues that Washington s policy in Southern Africa could best be understood in "the context of the global struggle between the US and the socialist bloc".64 It was "based on realpolitik analysis of US interests"65 and was as "part and parcel of the global policy of a superpower bent on preserving the international capitalist system".66 From World War II onwards the "amazing feature" of this US global policy was its "high degree of continuity".67 He also looks at the intransigence of the apartheid state in terms of white settler colonialism. "In examining the thrust of US policy in Southern Africa, it is also important to mention the relationship between the rise of imperialism and the historical phenomenon of white settler colonialism", which can be described as "a particular expression of imperialist domination". In the imperialist scheme of things, South Africa "became and has remained the main fulcrum defining the sub-region ... imperialist operations in this part of the world have largely been centred there". Dzimba69 devotes a whole book to the apartheid regime s efforts to destabilize Zimbabwe, correctly arguing that South Africa feared that a politically stable and economically successful Zimbabwe would stand in "sharp contrast to the lie about human relations that was apartheid".70 The rationale for the destabilization of the black-ruled states was to prevent the success of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) that was to become the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as this development threatened South Africa s programme for the regional economic community - the Constellation of Southern African States.71 Zimbabwe was singled out for destabilization because it possessed "the strongest economy and transport system" in region and potentially was "the hub round which any SADC would become a reality". SADC therefore, represented "the most shattering regional political defeat" for South Africa. Thus destabilization was "a pre-emptive response"73
Bugailiskis74 treats the "problem" of Namibia as one of conflict prevention, management and resolution and assesses the implementation of the settlement plan from the perspective of "the role and effectiveness of third parties in mediating conflict". She highlights issues that were ignored or glossed over during the negotiation process but which were to dog the implementation phase, such as the issue of SWAPO bases inside Namibia, arguing that "unresolved or unanticipated issues cannot be avoided during the implementation process".76 Third parties [the implementers] were often called upon "to address issues which had either been purposefully ignored or unanticipated" during the earlier stages of the negotiations.
While accepting that some "formations" might have crossed from Angola, Adamishin78 believes that "the significant part of the [SWAPO] soldiers apparently, was dispersed in Namibia [earlier]", as there has been no explanation offered as to why neither the Angolans nor the Cubans had prior knowledge of the alleged invasion, noting that the Americans did not directly point a finger at "Cuban-Angolan patronage".79 It is interesting to note that Adamishin refers to the New York Accords as "the last diplomatic successes of the Soviet Union" but puzzling to the reader for him to suggest that the south-western African region was a "complex, rarely understood by us [Soviets] and, as a rule, distant from our vital interests processes in the Third World ". Baker makes a detailed study of constructive engagement, under which the Reagan administration "chose to work quietly with the South African government, stressing common strategic interests, empathizing with white fears, and utilizing a unilateral rather than a multilateral approach" to diplomatic negotiations. She contrasts Crocker s preoccupation with "white concerns" with his attitude towards the oppressed blacks to whom he "did not devote comparable time and attention", claiming that he needed "to know more about black attitudes, organizing strategies and bargaining power".83 To him, the black "political arena" was "an increasingly complex puzzle for outsiders".84 He "did not meet with many black leaders, nor did he address their political concerns in his speeches".85 In fact, for Crocker, the question of South Africa was one in which "it [was] not [America s] task to chose between black and white".
Cawthra87 takes the reader through Pretoria s early history - settler colonialism and expansionism; the rapport between the Boer and British settlers resulting in "unified white rule"; the introduction of apartheid and the resistance to the system; Pretoria s failed search for allies; the "outward policy"; the rise of the armed liberation struggles in (Ц. the region and South Africa s "total strategy" reaction. He exposes the power behind the aggressive and intransigent apartheid regime; its destabilization of the FLS; defiance towards the international community; the brutality of its security apparatus which subscribed to the doctrine of "might is right"; the use of terror and collective punishment as well as the use of black troops as canon fodder; propaganda and indoctrination of white civilians and army personnel etc. South Africa s regional strategy was to coerce neighbouring countries "not to permit the establishment by the ANC or SWAPO of military or political facilities on their territories".88 Cawthra aptly notes that in Namibia, the South African regime s failure to establish "a viable alternative to SWAPO" was "testimony" to the Organization s "political strength", and a major factor in Pretoria s intransigence.90 Koevoet s91 brutal activities are well documented.92 [This study contrasts sharply with the portrait of a disciplined and politically neutral SADF portrayed in Geldenhuys below].
Geldenhuys93 can be said to be the embodiment of cynicism. Referring the infamous April massacre, the General says that the South African security forces wrote a chapter "of courage and glory" and killed SWAPO combatants "under the UN flag".94 He cites Esterhuysen boasting, "SWAPO suffered one of their worst blows of a long war -after agreeing to a ceasefire".95 The book is more telling by what the General omits than by what he writes. He does not even discuss the activities of the notorious Koevoet whose activities he would have known as the overall commander of the South African forces. He refers to Namibians as "bush voters";96 the Bushmen battalion personnel as "town crazy"97 and to the FLS as "so-called".98 He claims to have "stayed out of party politics"99 and to have aimed at developing "a politically neutral Defence Force".100 He partially corrects himself by adding that this neutrality did not extend to SWAPO.101 He contradicts practically everyone else on the Cassinga massacre by claiming that the attack was not against refugees but "a PLAN mechanized force".102 Despite SWAPO s willingness to negotiate, he describes the liberation movement s goal as having been to "seize power by force" For Geldehuys, the results of the election that gave SWAPO an overwhelming victory in the UN-supervised poll still remain "a mystery"!104
Nujoma105 describes how, in the 1920s under the Mandate, the South African government "continued the land allocation schemes initiated by the previous German colonial rulers". After WW II, returning white soldiers were "rewarded with yet more free land".106 Although SWAPO had supported the appointment of Ahtisaari as UN Commissioner for Namibia, Nujoma raises the question of his impartiality or otherwise in later years, saying that Ahtisaari was "not always our ally". For Nujoma, there were moments of triumph and hope in the struggle. He was present at the General Assembly session that terminated the mandate; for SWAPO, 5 October 1971 was a "turning point" when he was invited to address the UN Security Council - the first African liberation movement representative to do so;109 the Lisbon coup opened an 800 km long front and SWAPO s "geographical isolation was over. It was as if a locked door had suddenly swung open".110 There were also moments of despair. "Throughout the negotiations [leading to the New York Accords], the South Africans, the Angolans and the Cubans put themselves in charge of our affairs", observes Nujoma.111
Sellstrom112 explains the Nordic countries research project launched in 1994, "National Liberation in Southern Africa: The Role of the Nordic Countries" whose findings were published by the Nordic Africa Institute in the form of separate studies on Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. The main objective was to document and analyse the role of the Nordics in the straggles for majority rule and independence in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa.113 He discusses the nationalist movements "international relations", as at a "very early stage", they paid "serious attention to international diplomacy, managing to build an external support base where competing voices faltered".114 In other findings of the project, Peltola and Soiri115 reproduce an interview with Ahtisaari on his views on the "events of early April" or the April massacre. The desire not to "rock the boat" in spite of whatever actions Pretoria took, comes out as the major motive for his "approval" for the lifting of restriction to base of the South African forces.116 The Nordics "legitimised" the activities of these movements, proving that they were not totally dependent on the support of the Eastern bloc. Shubin — the former Head of the African Section of the International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) - is rightly quoted as saying that the Nordics "served as a kind of bridge [between the liberation movements and] the West".118
Gromyko119 sets out to show "the role and position of Africa in the global strategy of US imperialism" and "exposes the plans and actions of the US on the African continent" in its bid to create a "firm foothold there".120 The author agrees with the observation that the perceived "Soviet threat" was a "myth" or a "clumsy attempt" on the part of Washington "to disguise [its] neocolonialist designs" on the independent countries of Africa and the national liberation movements.121 He agrees more with the conclusion that Africa had become "a confrontation zone" between the US and the Soviet Union.122
Crocker123 is a detailed almost day-by-day account of the exploits of the architect of "constructive engagement" and "linkage" in advancing American interests and policies. High Noon is indeed "a record of an American diplomatic strategy", that "helped [the US] to win the Cold War in the Third World"124 Like Bugailiskis, Crocker saw the conflict in Southern Africa as "a case study of conflict resolution" in a polarized region that cried for "third party mediation".125 He acknowledges that the FLS were "a key political forum" and refers to Zimbabweans as "the voice of believers in the armed struggle".127
Engel says after independence, Zimbabwe rapidly became "a highly respected member of the international community, particularly among so-called Third World countries". This was "reflected in the number of posts or functions to which the country was elected by African or other non-aligned countries".129 He correctly says that Zimbabwe followed both a policy of reconciliation vis-a-vis the white population in the country and "a strict anti-apartheid policy vis-a-vis South Africa"130 and regarded both Namibia and South Africa as "top priority" issues on the country s foreign policy agenda. Speaking of "constructive engagement" and "linkage", he points out that the Reagan administration provided the South African government with "the power to veto multilateral diplomacy".132 In addition to the Korean Airliner incident and the US invasion of Grenada in 1983, Engel rightly notes that Zimbabwe s differences with the US over the morality of the latter s policy towards Southern Africa resulted in a major confrontation, with Washington finally suspending development aid to Zimbabwe.
Engel accurately reflects Zimbabwe s role as Chairman of NAM in the negotiations over Namibia s independence at the UN in 1989, particularly in the use of what he calls "African diplomacy" - the effective use by the African Group of their numerical strength in the General Assembly to set the agenda on the anti-apartheid question.133 The Bibliography is especially good for Southern African studies.
Sivograkov 34 gives an informative account of the early history of the relations between the USSR and the anti-racist/anti-apartheid movements of South Africa, especially the ANC and the Communist Party of South Africa (SACP), beginning in 1927.
Shubin135 exposes the myth of the "Soviet bogey" which the Western powers employed as a pretext to deny the people of Southern Africa independence. Books purporting to be academic and scholarly works were written by "police agents and renegades; others by full time propaganda experts connected with the Pretoria regime" -all with one common feature - to prove that a "communist conspiracy" originating from Moscow was behind the liberation movements.136
Solodovnikov137 writes about the debate in the USSR in the 1980s on Moscow s role in Africa, especially with regard to apartheid and the liberation movements, that was to lead to the downgrading of relations with the ANC and to the establishments of diplomatic relations with the apartheid regime in 1992, two years before the first all-race democratic elections in South Africa.
Eidelberg138 makes the interesting observation that while constructive engagement envisaged the "undercutting of Soviet influence in Southern Africa by weaning its clients, Angola and Mozambique, out of Moscow s influence", it was rather the Soviets who would "lose interest in these countries".
The above historiography demonstrates overwhelming agreement among scholars, political scientists, politicians and diplomats that the alleged fear of communism and the perceived "Soviet threat" were used as pretexts by the US, South Africa and their sympathisers to deny the people of Namibia their independence. It was but a strategy in the game of power politics.
Approbation
The findings and conclusions of the thesis were discussed at the Centre for Southern African Studies of the Institute for African Studies, Moscow? April 2004. The author also expressed some of the ideas and conclusions at the 8 Conference of Africanists (Moscow, 1999) and at the 1st Executive Course in Managing Peace Missions (Centre for Defence Studies, University of Zimbabwe, 2002).
Publications
The main themes covered in the thesis, especially the determinants of South African foreign policy as well as the Reagan administration s policies of "constructive engagement" and "linkage" towards Southern Africa, are reflected in the author s following publications:
In Russian:
1. Ot Zhenevskoi konferentsii po sozdaniyu uslovii dlya uregulirovaniya - к Nyu-Yorkskim soglasheniiyam. Faktory "konstruktivnogo vzaimodeistviya" і "uvyazki" v dostizheii nezavisimosti Namibiei. Yuzhnaya Afrika na poroge tretyego tysyacheletiya, Mostoa, Institut Afriki RAN, 2002, pp. 128-143
2. Namibiya v kachestve zalozhnika vneshnei politiki SShA I YuAR v epohu "konstruktivnogo vzaimodeistviya". Afrikanskii Yugo-Zapad. Opyt mirotvorchestva. Uchenye zapiski Instituta Afriki RAN, vypusk 20, Moskva, Izdatelskii dom XXI vek-Soglasie, 2000, pp. 70-96.
3 Rol OON v uregulirovanii namibiiskoi problemy. VIII konferentsiya afrikanistov. Afrika na poroge tretyego tysyacheletiya. Tezisy. Moskva, Institut Afriki RAN, 1999, pp. 198-199.
In English:
Shubin, Vladimir; (Editors), Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 2001, pp. 98-110.
6. The Role of the United Nations in the Settlement of the Namibian Question. VIII Conference of Africanists. Africa on the Treshold of the New Millenium. Abstracts.; Moscow, Institute for African Studiesm Russian Academy of Sciences, 1999, pp. 178-179.
Structure of the thesis
The thesis is divided into six sections - this Introduction, four Chapters, the Conclusion, as well as the Bibliography and Addendum. Chapter I gives a historical overview and background to the Namibian question and discusses the settlement plan. Chapter II focuses on the delay of the implementation of the plan occasioned by South Africa s intransigence, aided and abetted by the policies of "constructive engagement" and "linkage" adopted by the Reagan administration in Washington in the context of super power rivalry vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union. Chapter III discusses the first phase of the implementation of the settlement plan - marred by what the UN refers to as "events of early April" but commonly known as the "April massacre". Chapter IV discusses the "resumed" implementation process, which, despite continued South African non-compliance, successfully concluded with Namibia attaining independence on 21 March 1990. The Conclusion is a critique of the role of the UN and other interested parties in the political settlement of the Namibian question as well as the impact of, and lessons that can be drawn from, Namibia s liberation straggle.
The Bibliography includes UN documents - General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, reports, statements, protocols, agreements and publications, including those of the UN Institute for Namibia. It also includes NAM and SWAPO documents; books, articles in journals and periodicals and chapters in books; Internet sources, thesis/dissertations, newspapers and journals, and interviews and discussions.
The Appendices provide key documents and UN resolutions for ease of reference, beginning with Article 22 of the League of Nations that set up the mandate system, the text of the mandate for German Southwest Africa and the UN Council for Namibia Decree No. 1 on the protection of the national resources the Territory. Key Security Council resolutions included are 385 (1978) (the strongest and most favourable to SWAPO up to that time); 431 and 432 (1978) (adopted on the same day taking note of the proposal for a settlement and appeasing South Africa by postponing the thorny issue of Walvis Bay respectively; 435 (1978) adopting the settlement plan; 439 (1978) declaring in advance as "null and void" the results of South Africa s unilateral internal elections scheduled for 4-8 December 1978; 601 (1987) affirming that all outstanding issues relevant to the implementation of its resolution 435 (1978) had been resolved and the "implementation resolutions" 628, 629, 632, 640 and 643 (1989). Two General Assembly resolutions included are: 1514(XV) (1960) - "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" and ES-8/2 adopted at the 1981 special emergency session on Namibia convened by Zimbabwe. Up until then, it was perhaps the strongest General Assembly resolution ever adopted on Namibia.
Other documents are the Principles for a Peaceful Settlement; the Geneva Protocol; the two New York Accords - all 1988 - and a [sample] communique of the Coordinating Bureau of NAM. Martti Ahtisaari s interview on the "events of early April" or the April massacre provides an insight into his controversial decision. Finally, there is the author s speech to the UN Security Council on behalf of Zimbabwe and tiV Coordinating Bureau of NAM.on the occasion of Namibia Day (25 August 1989) and Sam Nujoma s inaugural speech as the first President of the Republic of Namibia.
Acknowledgements
It is not possible for me to thank all those who in one way or the other assisted me in writing this thesis but will mention just but a few and the many will remain anonymous. To mention but a few, I am grateful to my wife Rutendo who always encouraged me to take up the Ph D saying I "can do it"; to my daughters Farai and Ruvimbo for typing the original manuscript in Moscow that proved to be a draft indeed (Farai s computer skills came in very handy). I thank my family for their patience.
Particular acknowledgement goes to Dr Isack Stanslaus Gorerazvo Mudenge (now Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Zimbabwe) who, as Permanent Representative to the UN in New York, required that I fully participate in meetings relating to the question of Namibia, if only to ensure that I was on top of the situation in his absence. But for this encouragement, vision and leadership of the Mission team, I might never have developed the inspiration and interest that resulted in the thesis. Alexandra Bugailiskis, who was the Canadian Ambassador to Damascus in 1999, was kind to send me a copy of her MA dissertation. Ketai Makopa, the librarian at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was very helpful in securing press clippings from her counterpart at The Herald. Natasha Bozhko kindly translated portions of Namibia (Pritvorov) into English. Godfrey Ndongwe spared some of his time to proofread the manuscript. Joe Mhishi Tapera made suggestions on "methodology".
My acknowledgement also goes to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for having given me the opportunity to serve in the various capacities. Heading the Special Information Unit (2000) and Policy Research and Promotion (2000 and 2002-3) did delay the completion of the thesis as more often than not work "followed" me home. The experience nevertheless gave me added exposure. Taking charge of the Multilateral Affairs (Political) (2001-2) after the stint in New York helped keep me up to date with UN and other international affairs.
I am especially indebted to Dr Vladimir Gennadyevich Shubin who guided me through the preparation of the thesis and provided much of the resource materials in the form of vital literature and encouraging me in the face of many delays. He also translated portions of White Sun of Angola (Adamishin). Last but not least, I am grateful to Gennady Shubin for translating the Summary of the thesis into Russian.
Internal settlement: the Zimbabwe precedent
To a very large extent, events in Rhodesia influenced Pretoria s strategy in Namibia as the situation had close similarities. The "internal settlement" strategy was also being pursued but without success in "Zimbabwe-Rhodesia". The Smith-Muzorewa internal settlement had been seen as a model for Namibia. However, the decisive victory of the Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe in the January 1980 elections came as a rude shock to South Africa and reinforced its intransigence over Namibia. According to Martin and Johnson, the outcome had been a particularly bitter blow for South Africa as Pretoria had pumped more than lOmillion US Dollars into Zimbabwe to subsidize Muzorewa s campaign in particular, in a vain attempt to prevent a ZANU (PF) victory. Since their involvement in "police action" in Rhodesia in the mid-1960s, the South Africans were ь said to have invested 300 million US Dollar in the Rhodesian war against the African ( nationalists.243 It became clear that South Africa s creature, the so called Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), could not win an election against SWAPO despite the massive amounts of money and slick public relations made available to the puppets. South Africa could simply not afford developments that would show up her weakness, which might be an encouragement to her own African majority. The internal settlement strategy was carried out hand in hand with the policy of "Namibianization" and the setting up of paramilitary groups that had not existed when the settlement plan was agreed to. Like the American policy of "Vietnamization", Namibianization was a policy of recruiting Namibians into military and paramilitary organizations with the aim of making Namibians fight Namibians on the pretext that South Africa faced a "total onslaught" which required a "total strategy" response by Pretoria.244 The most notorious of these paramilitary or counter-insurgency units was Koevoet (Afrikaans for crowbar). It was established in 1979, a year after the adoption of resolution 435 (1978) by Brigadier Hans Dreyer who had served with the Rhodesian Special Branch as a member of the South African Police contingent in that country and was acquainted with the operations of the equally infamous Rhodesian "Selous Scouts . Koevoet was to become part of SWAPOL in April 1985. In announcing the decision to parliament on 18 April 1985 President P.W. Botha said that the move was "in keeping with the Government s view that, wherever possible, administrative functions affecting the Territory should be in South West African hands".245
In August 1980, Pretoria inaugurated the South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF), composed of various Namibian tribal groups. As Moleah puts it, "the purpose of this was to Namibianize the conflict and create internal forces that could defeat SWAPO militarily".246 Namibianization was extended to the police in April 1981, when the South West Africa Police (SWAP later SWAPOL) was formally inaugurated. SWATF and SWAPOL were under South African command. If any doubts existed that Namibianization was an attempt to circumvent resolution 435 (1978), the South African commander of SWATF was to later dispel these doubts. Speaking in May 1982, Major General Lloyd said that SWATF was to be seen in the context of the Namibian "independence process" where it would form "the basis of the defence force of the new state." According to him, the demilitarisation process laid out in the United Nations plan and resolution 435 (1978) would only be "a temporary phase that should last only for the duration of the election campaign... After the election the new constitution will provide for a defence force which will incorporate the SWATF as we know it today"247
The first black ethnic army unit to be formed was the so-called Bushmen Battalion (later 201 Battalion) in the Caprivi Strip in 1974. In 1977, 41 Battalion (later known as 911 Battalion) composed of Damaras, Hereros, Tswanas, Namas, Basters (Coloureds), San, Ovambos and whites, was also formed. The South West African Territorial Force (SWATF) was formed in August 1980. Namibianization was extended to the police in April 1981 when the South West Africa Police (SWAPOL) was formally inaugurated.
Since Namibians did not accept the tribal administrations, Pretoria first set up tribal armed police whose main task was to protect the bantustan leaders. "Namibianization" was extended to the police, army and other para-military forces, but under South African command. "Namibianization" became the linchpin of South Africa s dirty war aimed at perpetuating its illegal occupation of the Territory in spite of the provision in the mandate agreement that "the military training of the natives, otherwise for the purposes of internal police and the local defence of the territory, shall be prohibited". Since Namibians refused to "volunteer" for these units, South Africa used "the usual coercive and intimidatory tactics". The process of Namibianization, especially the incorporation of Koevoet into the South West Africa Police, had serious implications for the implementation of the settlement plan as the police forces were charged with the "primary responsibility for maintaining law and order during the transition period".2 3 The unit was most brutal in its operations, impersonating freedom fighters and usually took no prisoners.249 Geneva pre-implementation conference
Despite South Africa s intransigence and double standards, the Secretary General continued to be optimistic that Pretoria would cooperate in the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). He convened the "Pre-implementation Conference" [of resolution 435 (1978)] at Geneva 7 to 14 January 1981 between South Africa and SWAPO under the auspices and chairmanship of the United Nations, "to get a firm agreement on a date for a cease fire and the start of implementation of the proposal which would allow for the achievement of Namibian independence before the end of 1981"."u The FLS, which now included Zimbabwe and whose recent independence had given SWAPO "a moral boost",251 the OAU and the CG sent observers to the conference.
Even though the Chairman of the meeting, Brian Urquhart, noted in his opening statement that he believed that the technical issues relating to implementation had essentially been resolved and that none existed which could possibly justify any failure to decide to go forward, there was to be no implementation agreement. South Africa wrecked the conference on the pretext of UN impartiality claiming inter alia, that the United Nations had "disqualified itself from supervising free and fair elections in Namibia, in particular, by recognizing SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia and by its attitude towards other political parties in the
Cuito Cuanavale and Calueque: the turning point
The code was however still based on the principles but did not require monitoring.371 As the anti-apartheid crusade grew, both houses of Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (AAA) of 1986.372 Although President Reagan vetoed the AAA, an overwhelming majority in both the Senate and House of Representatives overturned the veto on 3 October 1986. According to Baker, the vote overturning the veto was one of the most decisive defeats for Reagan s foreign policy during his eight years in the White House, "astonishing many political observers at home and abroad".373 Elsewhere in the region, South Africa on 19 May 1986 extinguished "a glimmer of hope" about resolving the crisis in South Africa itself when it launched a three-pronged ground and air attack against alleged ANC bases in Botswana, Zimbabwe and Zambia just as the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (EPG) appeared to be on the verge of reaching agreement on "a negotiating concept" over apartheid.374
The repeal of the Clark Amendment further called into question the even-handedness of the United States, "the honest broker". In January 1986, the UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, enjoying new official American support resulting from the repeal, was invited to Washington where Reagan received him and the red carpet rolled out on every possible occasion. In fact, he was given "all the protocol of a visiting head of state".375 Angola was naturally angered by this US duplicity of running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. On 13 March 1986, President dos Santos accused the Reagan administration of "complicity" and direct involvement, "hand in hand with Pretoria" in the acts of aggression and destabilization against Angola in contrast to "the willingness and flexibility" displayed by his country throughout the negotiating process. He said US support for the aggression and destabilization of his country jeopardized Washington s "credibility as a mediator". With that, Angola broke off the negotiations.
The turning point in the negotiations apparently came from a combination of the siege at Cuito Cuanavale and the confrontation at Calueque. The lull in the US mediated Angola/South Africa talks lasted until March 1987 when the Angolans were said to have signalled through Congolese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso that they might resume the negotiations.377 The subsequent "talks about talks", largely centred on the Angolan "platform" of 1984. In July 1987, Cuba was said to have also signalled to Washington its desire to join the Angola/South African talks.378 On 4 August 1987, a joint Angolan/Cuban proposal offered a reduction from three years to two years in the timetable for the withdrawal of the Cuban troops in southern Angola.379
While exploring the avenue of negotiations, the Angolan government also focused on the battlefield. Simultaneously with the "talks about talks", the Angolans went on the offensive against UNITA, Luanda s attempt to re-capture Mavinga in 1987 was not successful as South Africa came to UNITA s support "with several thousand troops, fighter aircraft, and long-range artillery".380 The South African and UNITA forces advanced to lay siege on Cuito Cuanavale, "a strategic Angolan forward base and airfield".381 The then commander of the South African forces Geldenhuys, denies a South African defeat [or at least a standoff] at Cuito Cuanavale, saying that the claim that Pretoria ever wanted to capture Cuito Cuanavale was a "myth".382 He claims that Pretoria made "a tactical withdrawal executed under operational conditions" in which "fighting could still take place".383
Nevertheless, the siege is credited with important decisions that were to change the course of the Angola/Namibia negotiations. According to Baker, Havana decided to increase the number of its troops in Angola by 15,000 to 50,000.384 Crocker quotes Castro as saying that the siege of Cuito Cuanavale "created a crisis and forced me to act". 85 The reinforcements were said to be "experienced, mature troops rather than the garrison forces normally supplied, and they would take a role in front-line combat rather than being restricted to logistical support operations as previously".386 For the first time since the mid-1970s, large numbers of Cuban troops moved into southern Angola in December 1987; one unit went to relieve Cuito Cuanavale while another continued south toward the Namibian border. By early 1988, a combined force of Cubans, Angolans and SWAPO forces had established a 270-mile front within twenty miles of the Namibian border. In Baker s words, this expansion of Cuba s military role "produced a critical turning point in the thirteen-year-old conflict and in the negotiations.388 Crocker gives an even more menacing picture of the Cuban-FAPLA-SWAPO force.389
The subsequent encounter along the border at Cuito Cuanavale on 26-27 June 1988 during which the Cuban air force bombed the dam and bridge at Calueque and the SADF armour and artillery units "pulled back across the border", culminated in what Crocker refers to as "a direct and bloody encounter".390 The most significant result was said to be South Africa s loss of air supremacy over south-western Angola as after these encounters, the Angolan/Cuban aircraft reportedly were able to over-fly South African military facilities in Namibia, "raising concern" in Pretoria that Angolan-Cuban forces "might cross the border and substantially escalate the war".391 The SADF also reportedly took "relatively high white casualties",392 leading to a backlash among the regime s white supporters. Following that encounter, South African Defence Minister Malan appealed to
Crocker to, "do something concrete about the situation". Crocker is said to have kept quiet but a State Department spokesman commented that it was for the parties to decide whether they wished to pursue "illusory military solutions".393 In Baker s words, Castro s decision to escalate Cuba s military role in Angola, "to which Crocker turned a blind eye", produced "the critical pressure needed to persuade Pretoria to negotiate seriously".394 It was also at that point that the South African military - which had ascended to power when the then Defence Minister Pieter W. Botha became Prime Minister in 1978 - apparently decided to, or was forced to, bow out of politics as Pretoria seemed to realize "the geopolitical limits of its power". Even Crocker saw the Calueque encounter as having "marked a psychological watershed".Principles for a peaceful settlement Against this backdrop of Cuito Cuanavale and Calueque, the talks that had slowly re-started in March 1987 accelerated. A series of tripartite meetings involving Angola, Cuba and South Africa chaired by the US (Crocker) but with informal Soviet participation began in London on 3 May 1988 ending on 13 December 1988 in Brazzaville. According to Baker, it was at the Governor s Island meeting in New York following the 26-27 June crucial military encounter at Calueque that "indications of Pretoria s changed attitude [to negotiate seriously] became clear".397 At these talks, the three parties produced the "Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in South-western Africa"398 [see Appendix 13] which set out a framework for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and re-deployment towards the north of Cuban troops and their staged and total withdrawal from Angola. These talks coincided with the author s arrival at UN Headquarters in New York from Beijing to take up his post as Zimbabwe s Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations. The UN was to become the nerve centre of negotiations on the implementation of the settlement plan.
Explanatory statement: "bankable assurances"
The implementation process formally "resumed" on 13 May when the Joint Commission determined that SWAPO forces were confined to base in Angola under UNTAG monitoring north of the 16th parallel, not as per the settlement plan, but in terms of the Brazzaville Protocol. In the midst of the April fiasco, UNTAG had rapidly built up its numbers so that by 20 April its total strength was 3,000. Its initial major preoccupation was the implementation of the Mt. Etjo agreement, which "was not part of [its] official mission".606 UNTAG s full compliment of 4,650 troops for the military component from 50 countries and 500 police monitors from 41 countries607 was in place by 9 May 1989.608 Brigadier General Daniel Opande (Kenya) was the Deputy Force Commander to ІЛ General Prem Chand.
Notwithstanding South Africa s "suspension" of the implementation process, the UN continued to put in motion the political processes provided for in the settlement plan timetable, though inevitably at a slower pace. The Secretary General informed a delegation of the Coordinating Bureau of NAM and the African Group in New York on 9 May that he was not only considering personally visiting Namibia but was also weighing the possibility of meeting a longstanding FLS request, that of appointing an African to deputize Ahtisaari.60 Botswana s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Legwaila Joseph Legwaila soon emerged as the front-runner for the post, a prospect that did not appear to have gone down well with Ahtisaari.610 The subsequent appointment of Ambassador Legwaila as Deputy Special Representative to Ahtisaari was widely welcomed, especially in Africa.6n.
It may be recalled that following a summit of the FLS in Gaborone on 8 March 1989, Chairman President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia had announced that the alliance would send a delegation to "monitor" the Namibian independence process.612 A strategy long advocated by the FLS Permanent Missions was the setting up of an observer mission in Windhoek and the encouragement of as many sympathetic non-governmental and church organizations as possible to, in Ambassador Mudenge s words "flood Namibia" during the transition period. These missions would not only act as the eyes and ears of the international community, but their overt presence would act as deterrence to the inevitable South African attempts to derail the independence process. Reports based on first hand experience that the observer missions sent to their governments and Permanent Missions at the UN, complemented by those of the media, were a valuable source of information in raising the consciousness of international public opinion on the transition process. Front-line States Observer Team (FROLISOT) encountered numerous obstacles irom Pretoria before formally establishing a presence in Windhoek on 5 May 1989.613 Ambassador Lt. General В N Mibenge, the Principal Delegate of Zambia [Chairman of the FLSJ headed the Front-line States Observer Team (FROLISOT). Zimbabwe s Principal Delegate was Ambassador Kennedy Manyika. A member of the Zimbabwe Permanent Mission to the UN, Christopher Mutsvangwa (Counsellor) was part of the Zimbabwean delegation. The FLS initially sought credentials from the UN Secretary General through the Chairman, Zambia. While the Secretary General did not respond, the South African appointed Administrator General in Namibia, Louis Pienaar sought to make political capital out of the mission on the question of visas by insisting that the designated members of the observer team "observe standard procedures, which have been observed by other observer missions".614 South Africa thus sought explicit recognition from the FLS of Pretoria s authority over Namibia. FROLISOT presence and role in Namibia was highly regarded.615
Britain, Canada, China, France, German Democratic Republic, Norway, the Soviet Union and the United States of America were among the countries that established observer missions in Windhoek.616 The OAU set up shop after a three-member team consisting of Ambassador Yilma Tadesse, Brigadier Hashin Mbita, Executive Secretary of the OAU Liberation Committee and Mensa Bonsu, Chief of the OAU Decolonization Secretariat who had initially been denied entry by Pretoria.617 The Commonwealth sent a team of observers from seven countries618 while the Inter-Parliamentary Union appointed a three-member observer mission.619
Contrary to South African Foreign Minister s assurance to the Secretary General in December 1988 that the notorious counter-insurgency unit, Koevoet would be disbanded; Pretoria transferred about 2,000 of the 3,000-member unit to the South-West Africa Police (SWAPOL).620 The role of this unit, which as we have discussed had not existed in 1978, remained the major point of contention between the Secretary General and Pretoria almost to the end of the transition process. If the April massacres signalled the beginning of a concerted strategy by South Africa to intimidate SWAPO and its supporters, the critique of the "resumed" implementation of the settlement plan is largely an account and litany of South African intimidation621 of the Namibian population, with Koevoet at the centre of that intimidation.622
Meanwhile, in Engel s observation, Zimbabwe s diplomacy on Namibia after the April massacre concentrated on this paramilitary unit, which had been substantially involved in the massacre. He notes that three related demands had already been formulated by President Mugabe in an opening address to the Ministerial Meeting of the NAM s Co-ordinating Bureau in Harare 17-19 May 1989 in preparation for the 9th Summit scheduled for Belgrade in September of that year. These were the dismantling of Koevoet, the rejection of its integration into South West African Police (SWAPOL) and a reinforcement of UNTAG.623
Pre-conditions for free and fair elections
The conclusion addresses four broad areas. Firstly, it evaluates the role of the United Nations (UN) in terms of its (international) responsibility under the Charter towards the trust Territory of Namibia. Secondly it examines the role and conduct of the various interested parties to the dispute. Thirdly, the question of Namibia was what can be termed a "microcosm" of international relations because it brought into play a whole range of theories and practices, such as international law; the right to national self-determination; human and equal rights; national interest; international organisation and the veto power; the role of regional alliances; conflict prevention, management and resolution etc. In that context therefore, we make some observations on the impact of the conflict on international relations in general. Lastly, the thesis draws some lessons for the UN in its peacekeeping activities.
The thesis establishes that the United Nations had the historical, moral and legal responsibility to bring Namibia to independence, which responsibility derived from the Charter and was re-enforced by Security Council resolution 435 (1978). The Charter obligated South Africa to place Namibia under the responsibility of the UN. The "role" that the United Nations played was in fulfilment of that responsibility. In essence, the dispute arose from South Africa s refusal, on various pretexts - abetted by some powerful founder members of the Organization - to fulfil its obligation to the United Nations. The UN may, in a sense, be accused of having attempted to shirk from its legal and historical responsibility by recognising the dispute as being between the people of Namibia and South Africa whereas it was legally speaking, between the UN and South Africa, with the Namibians being at the receiving end.
The UN was able to assert its responsibility over "the international Territory" of Namibia through, not only the political will of the General Assembly, but also with the assistance of the Organisation s legal arm, the International Court of Justice (I С J). Notwithstanding its 1966 opinion, the 1С J was able to demonstrate its relevance as a tool in international relations. With the issue of national self-determination taking the centre stage on the UN agenda after WW II, the case of Namibia became instrumental in the development of "international law of decolonization" so to speak, and dealt a blow to the "legitimisation" of colonialism by the 1884 Berlin Conference on the "partition" of Africa. Although not directly related to Namibia, several resolutions that the UN adopted with regard to human rights and decolonization reflected the Organisation s experience and role on Namibia.
The dispute demonstrated the predicament of small powers in the modern day world where one, or a few, powerful nations can hold the world to ransom, in pursuit of their national interest. The powerful nations often employ double standards, marginalize the UN and pursue unilateralist approaches. They are not above using hidden agendas іл involving the United Nations in some operations. They highjack the operations as soon as the action has been "authorised". The Korean War, the 1991 Gulf War and now the "war on terror" in Iraq, Afghanistan etc. are such examples where the UN has been sidelined. When the UN is seen as being "unhelpful" as in the case of the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, the few mighty powers "go it alone" or with the so-called "coalitions of the willing".
The formation of the Contact Group was nothing but an example of the strategy by the more powerful members of the UN to marginalize or sideline the Organisation in the settlement of international conflicts. For their own national or multilateral political interests, the Western members of the Security Council for a long time even refused to discuss the question of Namibia on the grounds that the issue was not a threat to international peace and security, and by implication, trivialised Namibia s independence. While the UN continued to discuss Namibia and adopt resolutions, the initiative and power to resolve the problem largely lay with the US which, having "nationalised" the issue, not only made the UN practically irrelevant, but also proceeded to exclude SWAPO from the negotiations that led to the New York Accords. Namibians were denied their freedom on the pretext of "fighting communism".
Under its age-old expansionist tendencies, Pretoria s sought to annex Namibia, and if that were not possible, then to exploit its vast mineral and agricultural resources and use the Territory as a "buffer" in defence of apartheid for as long as was possible. For the United States and its Western permanent member allies, Namibia was merely a "pawn" in a game of super power rivalry in the furtherance of their global, strategic and economic interests. The "West" hyped these perceptions as a strategy to deny the "East" resources inherited from colonialism. Namibia therefore demonstrated the key role of these factors in international relations.
The desire of the US to impose hegemonistic control over Southern Africa - a region that it regarded to be within its "sphere of influence" - was ultimately responsible for the perpetuation of Namibia s colonial status. To the extent that the US was able to obtain two agreements linking the independence of Namibia to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, it can be said that Washington achieved its objectives but at a moral cost. The "victory" was nevertheless a small step towards Washington s global hegemony.
The South African regime took advantage of this super power rivalry to further its objectives of protecting apartheid, using the strategy of what, for lack of a better term, the author refers to as the "illusion of progress". It pretended to be negotiating in good faith -and in fact signed agreements - while it was engaged in actions intended to achieve the exact opposite. For South Africa, constructive engagement represented the fulfilment of one of the longstanding key goals of South African foreign policy - to be accorded "legitimacy" by being accepted as an ally of the so-called "free world" in the struggle against perceived communist onslaught and Soviet "expansionism". South Africa continued to attack Angola precisely to keep the Cuban troops in Angola in order to keep linkage on the agenda as an obstacle to Namibia s independence. On the one hand, no one was saying that the Cubans should not withdraw from Angola. What everyone was saying was that South Africa should end its aggression against, and occupation of, Angolan territory and should concede Namibia s independence.
The question of Namibia is a comprehensive case study in conflict prevention, management and resolution. It gives historians, politicians and diplomats alike an insight into the art of diplomacy and negotiation. Africa s willingness or capacity to play its rightful role in conflict prevention, management and resolution has been the subject of much international debate. Namibia is an obvious example where Africa did in fact play a key role in the negotiation and resolution of the conflict. In helping liberate Namibia, together with other "progressive forces", the OAU/AU made a significant step in the realization of one of the major objectives of its Charter, namely, the total liberation of the continent. The sub-regional group or Africa s own "Contact Group"- the FLS - also played an indispensable role in this liberation effort. National liberation was a key objective for the establishment of NAM. The implementation of the Namibia settlement plan provided the Movement with an opportunity well utilized, to play its due role in achieving that objective. Other sub-regional bodies such as the SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security and the new African Union Peace and Security Council can draw lessons from that experience.
